I. Introduction
One of the major obstacles toward mandatory limits on greenhouse gas emissions in the United States is the impact of such limits on the international competitiveness of US firms.
Limits on greenhouse gas emissions --be they in the form of regulation, a carbon tax or a capand-trade system 1 -may impose extra costs on US industries. Where foreign firms do not bear similar costs, US firms may lose their competitive edge. In particular, with a US climate policy in place, goods from countries without mandatory carbon restrictions -such as China, Brazil or India -may gain a price advantage over US goods. It is exactly this asymmetry that led the US Senate to reject the Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement that covers 55 per cent of global emissions but does not require emission cuts from developing countries. The competitiveness impact of US climate policy may play out both at home (on the US market) and abroad (on world markets). It can be particularly acute for energy-intensive manufacturers such as the iron and steel, aluminum, cement, glass, chemicals and pulp and paper industries.
This paper examines the extent to which federal climate policy could alleviate this competitiveness concern. More particularly, the paper assesses the limits imposed by World
Trade Organization ("WTO") agreements on possible competitiveness provisions in future climate legislation. Such competitiveness provisions would essentially aim at leveling the playing field by imposing the same or similar costs on imports, as US federal climate policy imposes on domestic US production. To level the playing field on world markets, US exports could also be exempted from domestic climate restrictions. As the United States is internationally bound by WTO law, any competitiveness provision that violates WTO agreements risks a challenge by the US' trading partners before the WTO dispute settlement body. If competitiveness provisions were to be used as a sweetener to enable federal climate legislation, the WTO consistency of such provisions is, therefore, crucial.
Section II briefly examines the policy reasons for and against competitiveness provisions in climate legislation. Section III explains how competitiveness provisions can take the form of 1 This paper only addresses government intervention that restricts greenhouse gas emissions; not subsidies that promote alternative energy sources (although such subsidies raise questions of WTO consistency of their own). In terms of ranking these different policy instruments, The Economist put it bluntly: "Governments can try to reduce emissions in three ways: subsidize alternatives, impose standards on products and processes, and price the greenhouse gases that cause the damage. The first is almost always a bad idea; the second should generally be avoided; the third is the way to go" (What price carbon? THE ECONOMIST, 17 March 2007 at 15).
trade measures, but that non-trade alternatives are also available. Section IV elaborates on the types of trade restrictions that would most likely not pass WTO muster (import bans, punitive tariffs, anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties). Sections V and VI provide alternatives that may be acceptable under WTO rules:
• First, a carbon tax or emission credits requirement on imports could be framed as WTO permissible "border adjustment" of a domestic, US tax or cap-and-trade system (Section V). Crucially, if such "border adjustment" does not discriminate imports as against US products, and does not discriminate some imports as against others, this type of competitiveness provision could pass WTO scrutiny without any reference to the environmental exceptions in Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").
• Second, even if "border adjustment" would not be permitted for process-based measures such as a domestic, US carbon tax, regulation or cap-and-trade system, and/or such "border adjustment" would be found to be discriminatory, the resulting GATT violation may still be justified by the environmental exceptions in GATT Article XX (Section VI).
Such justification would then most likely center on whether, under the introductory phrase of GATT Article XX, a US carbon duty, emission credit requirement or other regulation on imports is applied on a variable scale that takes account of local conditions in foreign countries, including their own efforts to fight global warming and the level of economic development in developing countries.
Section VII concludes with a specific proposal for a competitiveness provision and the questions that it would raise under WTO law.
II. Policy reasons for and against competitiveness provisions in climate legislation

A. The benefits of a competitiveness provision
The immediate demand for competitiveness provisions is economic in nature. As a matter of fairness, affected industries want to level the competitive playing field by imposing the same costs on imports as climate legislation would impose on US production. This economic rationale for competitiveness provisions -although it matters under the principle of "national treatment" discussed in Section V.C --is not likely to carry much weight in the WTO system for environmental exceptions (addressed in Section VI). That is why our attention should focus on the non-economic, environmental reasons for competitiveness provisions. There are at least four such reasons:
• Internalizing the social cost of carbon: As the 2006 Stern Report points out, climate change "is the greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever seen". 2 In particular, carbon emissions cause harm or social costs that are not calculated into the actual price of goods. To internalize this social cost of carbon --assessed in the Stern Report at $85 per tonne of CO2 3 --government intervention is needed. However, science tells us that emissions have the same effects from wherever they arise; hence, one government alone cannot resolve the problem (climate change is, in other words, a collective action problem). International cooperation is needed. Where such cooperation fails or is insufficient (which, arguably, is the case under the Kyoto Protocol), a government can either resign itself to the problem or act unilaterally. Such unilateral action, albeit second or third best, could then include a competitiveness provision forcing at least all those goods that enter the US market to internalize the social cost of carbon.
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• Carbon leakage or "emission migration": In a scenario where not all countries cut emissions --that is, some countries are free-riders --the United States may decide to cut its own emissions anyhow. Doing so may, however, lead some US companies to relocate to free-riding countries. This would not only cost US jobs and tax money, but could also increase carbon emissions elsewhere. Rather than reducing their emissions under a new US climate policy, relocated firms may then actually emit more in, for example, China or India.
• Enabling wider and deeper emission cuts within the United States itself: Competitiveness provisions are likely to reduce domestic business opposition against emission cuts. With a competitiveness provision in place, especially energy-intensive industries within the United
States may agree to be covered by federal climate policy. Without such provision, policy makers may end up excluding a number of industries altogether, may impose lower overall cuts and/or be pressured into handing out emission allowances for free (instead of auctioning them off; a system 2 STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2006), Executive Summary, at i, available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/8AC/F7/Executive_Summary.pdf. 3 Ibid., at xvi. 4 For a full explanation of the economic case for a competitiveness provision, in particular, border tax adjustment on carbon-intensive imports, see R. that is generally regarded as more effective). 5 In that sense, competitiveness provisions catch two birds with one stone: lower emissions abroad and at home.
• Offer an incentive for other countries to join international efforts to cut emissions:
Competitiveness provisions would force exporters into the United States to internalize the social cost of carbon. This would offer an incentive for foreign companies doing business with the United States to reduce their emissions. Foreign governments would also be given an incentive to impose their own emission cuts, or to agree to emission cuts under an international agreement acceptable to the United States: Doing so may exclude them from US import taxes or other US regulations under a competitiveness provision. Indeed, even if the enactment of a competitiveness provision may not be politically or otherwise realistic, it must be kept in mind that the mere threat of its enactment may push countries like China to cut emissions or otherwise alleviate US concerns.
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B. The costs of a competitiveness provision
As noted by the 2006 Stern Review, unilateral trade barriers "are clearly second best to implementing a similar carbon price across the global economy" through international agreements. 7 We must, therefore, remain acutely aware of the costs and risks of competitiveness provisions, five of which are summarized below.
• Barriers to trade are inefficient: Trade restrictions skew the optimal allocation of the world's resources and the principle of comparative advantage. They are also costly especially for US consumers and US industries that depend on imported inputs (such as the US car industry using imported steel).
• Competitiveness impact can be exaggerated and abused: Even where trade barriers may be needed as second or third best solutions, competitiveness provisions risk being abused by 5 The current European scheme, for example, covers only 46 per cent of the EU's total CO2 emissions and caps "only" 13,000 installations. importing-competing US industries for purely protectionist purposes unrelated to global warming.
In this respect, the competitiveness impact of climate policy is often exaggerated. The Stern
Review estimates that the cost of combating climate change now, would only be 1 per cent of global GDP, "this is equivalent to price changes of an order that we are used to dealing with all the time, through, for example, changes in exchange rates". 8 In the Report's opinion, even in energy intensive sectors, "the impacts are not very high" and since the bulk of trade in many of these industries is limited to within regional blocs (such as the European Union ("EU")),
"
[a]pplication of greenhouse gas policies within these blocs is likely to reduce competitive impacts dramatically". 9 Equally, the risk of relocation and carbon leakage can be exaggerated.
At the same time, there are exceptions. One OECD study, for example, shows that if the price of one tonne of CO2 were 15 euros, the loss of production of the cement industry in the EU would be 7.5 per cent in 2010 and that, as a result, production and emissions in the rest of the world would increase. In other words, in this instance, there would be carbon leakage. 10 Moreover, the introduction of mandatory emission cuts in Europe did lead to a significant increase in the price of electricity. Since there is no competition from outside the EU, European utilities simply reflected the price of emission allowances into higher consumer prices.
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• Future cooperation: Competitiveness provisions, and the unilateral action that comes with them, may undermine the trust necessary for future international cooperation and agreement on emission reductions. This is the potential flip-side of one of the hoped for benefits of a competitiveness provision: on the one hand, such provision may incentivize free-riders to join an international scheme; on the other hand, it may distance them even further and make it more difficult to find consensus.
• GATT Article XX (discussed in Section VI), a scheme would need to be set in place that varies the tax or import restriction depending, for example, on climate legislation already in place in the country of origin of, say, the imported steel. These costs must be weighed against the benefits that can be expected from a competitiveness provision.
• Risk of a WTO challenge: Any competitiveness provision with a serious trade impact is likely to trigger a WTO complaint. Given the vague nature of WTO law explained below, the WTO may either uphold or strike down the provision. Importantly, however, even if future US climate legislation were found to violate WTO law (not a certainty by far), the only remedy currently offered by the WTO dispute settlement system is that the United States would then have to change its legislation as to the future (or suffer retaliation if it fails to do so); no damages for past harm are due. Hence, a competitiveness provision could be included as part of a good faith effort to tackle climate change, pursuant to a good faith interpretation of relevant WTO rules. If the effort fails, and the WTO strikes down the provision, the immediate costs would be relatively limited.
The above list of costs and risks related to competitiveness provisions may well explain why none of the legislative proposals currently before the U.S. Congress include such provisions (with the exception of a safety-valve or absolute maximum on the price of emission allowances in some bills, discussed below; a measure that does not imply trade restrictions on imports).
Similarly, although the European scheme currently in place did include the possibility for EU member states to adapt their national allocation plan to take account of "the existence of competition from countries or entities outside the Union", this criterion was not applied by a have all been quick to reject the idea.
III. Policy options to address competitiveness concerns
A. Competitiveness provisions other than trade measures
The focus of this paper is trade measures, such as a carbon tax or other border restriction on carbon-intensive imports. Competitiveness concerns can, however, also be addressed by policies other than trade instruments. Below are six such alternatives.
• 20 Lessons should then, however, be learned from the current Kyoto mechanism which covers not only CO2 but also certain other gases such as HFC23, a heat-trapping gas 11,700 times stronger than CO2. Under Kyoto's Clean Development Mechanism, a reduction by, for example, Chinese chemical companies in HFC23 emissions can be bought by, for example, a European electricity company that cannot meet its carbon targets. However, to reduce HFC23 emissions is extremely cheap compared to the price of a CO2 emission credit. Some accounts speak of 0.5 euros/t of HFC23 in return of 8 euros/t of carbon. Put
• Grandfather current emission levels: that is, hand out free permits to emitting industries up to current emission levels, thereby not imposing any immediate emission cuts and only requiring companies to buy allowances if they increase their emissions; if companies lower their emissions, they can sell the permits that they received for "free" in the market. Such grandfathering of current emission levels would, however, have the drawback of rewarding the biggest emitters, i.e., those US companies that have so far not done anything to cut their emissions. It would also make it more difficult for new companies to enter the market (thereby potentially stifling competition).
• Industry carve-outs: to alleviate competitiveness concerns, the legislation can exclude certain energy-intensive industries from any emission reductions 21 ; the country's overall carbon target could then still be met by reductions elsewhere.
• Cross-subsidization: revenues raised by auctioning emission permits could be used to lower other costs on US firms such as taxes on labor or capital, or technology development and application costs.
• Safety-valves: a climate policy could impose a maximum price or safety-valve above which emission permits cannot be traded in the United States; this safety-valve could also be coupled to periodic review of whether US trading partners address climate change appropriately;
if US trading partners fail to act, in order to alleviate resulting competitiveness concerns, the safety-valve or ceiling price of US emission permits could then be lowered.
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• Besides a ban, the most obvious way to sanction imports from free-riding countries is to make them subject to additional or punitive import tariffs. This not only risks a violation of the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle discussed in Section V.D (in that imports from some countries, say, China would be discriminated as against imports from other countries, say, Europe); it also risks a violation of maximum tariff levels committed to by the United States at the WTO. Under Article II of the GATT, the United States bound itself to a certain maximum ceiling of tariffs, on a product by product basis, in exchange for similar tariff reductions by US trading partners. Most of the tariffs that the United States currently applies are at, or close to, that maximum ceiling. Hence, the United States has no or little leeway to add tariffs on imports for reasons related to climate change. 29 Unless such violation could be justified under the environmental exceptions in GATT Article XX (see Section VI below), any punitive "carbon tariff" would violate WTO rules.
B. Anti-dumping duties against "environmental dumping"
Rather than outright punitive tariffs, a more subtle alternative could be to frame the additional customs duties on imports from countries that do not have carbon restrictions in place, as duties to offset dumping, more specifically, "environmental dumping". In his proposal for a carbon tax, French Prime Minister de Villepin explicitly refers to "environmental dumping" as a justification for the tax. 30 On this view, since the price of imports from, for example, China, India or Brazil does not include the social cost of the carbon emitted during the production process of the imports -given that none of these countries impose carbon cuts --the imports are Although anti-dumping duties take the form of tariffs, they are explicitly permitted under WTO rules even if the resulting tariff exceeds a country's maximum ceiling discussed earlier.
However, this right to impose anti-dumping duties is strictly limited. The basic question is:
When is an import considered to be "dumped" on, in our case, the U.S. market? What is the benchmark or "normal value" against which we must compare the price of the import? The answer is simple: The benchmark is not U.S. prices which would fully incorporate the cost of carbon; rather, the benchmark is normal prices in China, Brazil or India, that is, the market of the country of origin of the import. In other words, the WTO defines dumping as sales of, for example, Indian steel on the U.S. market at a price below that asked for steel in India. Hence, anti-dumping duties can only be levied when U.S. import prices are below Indian prices. 31 For concessions by other WTO members. Moreover, even with a higher tariff ceiling for, say, steel imports, the question of most-favored-nation violation remains. 30 See supra note 14. 31 In some cases, the domestic price in the country of origin must not, or cannot be used (in case, for example, the exporting nation is not a "market economy" or in the event there are no sales of the like product in the country of origin). In that event, the import price into the United States must be compared to either (1) the price of the like product when exported to an "appropriate third country" (say, Europe); or (2) a reconstructed calculation of the cost of production in the country of origin (in our case, India) plus "a dumping purposes, import prices are not compared to carbon-restricted U.S. prices or to an ideal market price that internalizes the social cost of carbon. Thus, for as long as, for example, India does not restrict carbon emissions within India, or otherwise taxes carbon, for Indian exports not to internalize the social cost of carbon cannot be called dumping.
C. Counterveiling duties to offset the "subsidy" of not imposing carbon restrictions
Another alternative that continues to take the form of additional tariffs on imports would be to impose so-called counterveiling duties to offset subsidization of the imports in their country of origin. Joseph Stiglitz's proposal for a carbon duty is premised on this idea of unfair subsidies.
In his words, and applied to the absence of energy taxes and emission cuts in the United States as opposed to Europe:
"subsidy means that a firm does not pay the full costs of production. Not paying the cost of damage to the environment is a subsidy, just as not paying the full costs of workers would be … other countries should prohibit the importation of American goods produced using energy intensive technologies, or, at the very least, impose a high tax on them, to offset the subsidy that those goods currently are receiving".
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As with anti-dumping, the WTO explicitly permits the imposition of extra tariffs to offset a foreign subsidy, even if the resulting tariff exceeds a country's maximum ceiling discussed earlier. However, this right to impose counterveiling duties is strictly limited. The basic question is: When is an import considered to be "subsidized"? In our example, what is the benchmark against which the absence of emission cuts or a carbon tax in, for example, China --or, in
Stiglitz's case, the United States --must be compared?
For government policy to qualify as a subsidy under WTO rules there must be a financial contribution by the government (say, interest free loans) or other income or price support. 33 In reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits". See Article 2 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement. However, in both of these cases, as well, one is comparing or calculating two prices set within the regulatory context of, in our hypothetical, India. Thus, for as long as India does not impose emission cuts or otherwise taxes carbon within India, for Indian exports not to internalize the social cost of carbon cannot be called dumping. 32 Supra note 13 at 2. 33 Article 1 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Counterveiling Measures.
our example, the problem is not that the Chinese government is paying Chinese producers or is otherwise transferring funds; rather, the problem is that the government fails to act, that is, it fails to impose and collect a carbon tax or to otherwise force Chinese producers to internalize the full cost of carbon emitted in China.
One type of financial contribution recognized by the WTO that might, at first sight, cover this failure to act, is: "government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected". Moreover, even if the failure to impose a carbon tax or to otherwise force producers to internalize the cost of carbon were to qualify as a "subsidy", under WTO rules counterveiling duties to offset subsidies by foreign governments can only be levied in case the subsidy is specific to "an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries". 37 Not imposing a carbon tax or other emission cuts is a country-wide policy and not likely to meet the specificity requirement.
If so, there is no right to impose counterveiling duties. Although export subsidies are deemed to . To accept the argument of the United States that the comparator in determining what is "otherwise due" should be something other than the prevailing domestic standard of the Member in question would be to imply that WTO obligations somehow compel Members to choose a particular kind of tax system; this is not so. A Member, in principle, has the sovereign authority to tax any particular categories of revenue it wishes. It is also free not to tax any particular categories of revenues … What is "otherwise due", therefore, depends on the rules of taxation that each Member, by its own choice, establishes for itself".
36 But see the plan of a Chinese export tax on carbon-intensive exports, infra note 116. 37 Article 1.2 and Article 2 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Counterveiling Measures.
be specific (there is no need to prove the specificity requirement for export subsidies) 38 , not imposing a carbon tax at all, is not likely to be qualified as a subsidy contingent on export performance 39 : Even goods that are not exported (i.e. consumed within China) do not pay a carbon tax. Hence, not imposing a carbon tax is most likely neither a specific subsidy nor an export subsidy.
In sum, even though in economic terms not internalizing the full cost of carbon could be seen as "dumping" or a "subsidy", in legal-WTO terms, the failure of a government to impose a carbon tax or to otherwise force producers to internalize the full price of carbon, does not normally give other WTO members the right to impose offsetting duties on imports.
V. Import Restrictions in Respect of "Foreign-Emitted" Carbon that Stand a Better Chance to Survive WTO Scrutiny
Rather than imposing a ban, quantitative restriction or extra tariff on imports only, a better way to frame a U.S. competitiveness provision would be to portray the trade measure on imports as simply the import-equivalent of domestic U.S. climate policy. For WTO purposes, any measure that applies only to imports is suspect, as it can be presumed to be protectionist (it applies only to foreign goods; not to domestic products). That explains the outright prohibitions in GATT Article II (tariffs above a particular ceiling are prohibited) and GATT Article XI (quantitative restrictions on imports are generally prohibited). In contrast, a measure that applies to both imports and domestic products is fully accepted as long as it does not discriminate against imports (the obligation of "national treatment" discussed in Section C) or against imports from particular countries (the obligation of "most-favored-nation treatment" discussed in Section D).
The main challenge is, however, to convince the WTO that a U.S. competitiveness provision is only the extension of domestic U.S. climate policy, applied on an equal footing to imports. Section A addresses this challenge assuming that U.S. climate policy takes the form of a carbon tax or other price-based measure (such as a cap-and-trade system); Section B extends the analysis to carbon regulations (such as carbon intensity standards or labels). As will soon become 38 Article 2.3 the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Counterveiling Measures. 39 As required under Article 3.1 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Counterveiling Measures for a subsidy to be a prohibited export subsidy.
apparent "border adjustment" for taxes or other price-based measure (Section A) is easier to justify under WTO rules as compared to "border adjustment" for regulations (Section B).
A. "Border tax adjustment" based on a domestic, U.S. carbon tax or cap-andtrade system
If a U.S. competitiveness provision were to take the form of a price-based measure such as a duty, charge or tax on carbon-intensive imports, the line between (generally prohibited) border tariffs and (generally permitted) domestic taxes is set out in GATT Article II:2(a). This provision explains that the GATT's strict rules on maximum tariff ceilings do not prevent the United States "from imposing at any time on the importation of any product … a charge equivalent to an internal tax … in respect of the like domestic product or in respect of an article from which the imported product has been manufactured or produced in whole or in part".
More specifically, such "charge[s] [on imports] equivalent to an internal tax" are not subject to GATT Article II on tariffs, but GATT Article III:2 on domestic taxes (national treatment). The right to thus impose a domestic tax on imports is also referred to as "border tax adjustment".
Under "border tax adjustment", the flip-side of the right to impose a domestic tax also on imports is the right to rebate the same tax on domestic products that get exported. Under WTO rules, such rebates are not considered to be prohibited export subsidies. The reason behind this distinction between, on the one hand, adjustable product or indirect taxes and, on the other hand, non-adjustable producer or direct taxes is the so-called "destination principle" according to which products themselves should only be taxed in the country of consumption (in other words: exports get a rebate; imports get taxed). On this view, if products are only taxed in their place of consumption, countries preserve the right to choose their own level of taxation and trade neutrality is maintained as all products in a given market compete on the same competitive terms (without either double taxation or advantages from a more favorable tax regime in their country of origin). 44 The distinction also finds some support in the economic theory that product taxes are shifted forward into consumer prices, whereas producer taxes (such as taxes on profits) are not passed on into the price of a product. Thus, on this view, producer taxes, as they do not influence product prices, do not affect the competitiveness of products and there is, therefore, no need to make adjustments for imports so as to level the economic playing field. However, it is acknowledged today that even producer taxes are to a certain degree reflected in the price of a product. 45 and Counterveiling Measures refer more broadly to permissible rebates for indirect taxes "in respect of the production and distribution of exported products". 43 Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, L/3464, 20 November 1970, at para. 14 ("The Working Party concluded that there was convergence of views to the effect that taxes directly levied on products were eligible for tax adjustment … Furthermore, the Working Party concluded that there was convergence of views to the effect that certain taxes that were not directly levied on products were not eligible for tax adjustment"). 44 46 Given the discussion below it is, however, surprising how on the WTO website the following categorical statement could, until very recently, be found: "Under existing GATT rules and jurisprudence, 'product' taxes and charges can be adjusted at the border, but 'process' taxes and charges by and large cannot. For example, a domestic tax on fuel can be applied perfectly legitimately to imported fuel, but a tax on the energy consumed in producing a ton of steel cannot be applied to imported steel" (available until December 2006 at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_backgrnd_e/c3s3_e.htm). 47 Footnote 58 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Counterveiling Measures states: "The term 'direct taxes' shall mean taxes on wages, profits, interests, rents, royalties, and all other forms of income, and taxes on the ownership of real property". In contrast, "[t]he term 'indirect taxes' shall mean sales, excise, turnover, value added, franchise, stamp, transfer, inventory and equipment taxes, border taxes and all taxes other than direct taxes and import charges". A carbon tax is a specific excise tax and, in that sense at least, an indirect or product tax; it is not any of the types listed under 'direct taxes'; hence, a carbon tax is, in any event, an 'indirect tax' as it is "other than direct taxes". The question remains, however, to what extent these definitions in the Agreement on Subsidies and Counterveiling Measures on border adjustment for exports can be used also for purposes of interpreting GATT provisions on border adjustment for imports. In support of import-export equivalence see supra note 40. 48 Supra note 43 at para. 15: "It was generally felt that while this area of taxation was unclear, its importance -as indicated by the scarcity of complaints reported in connection with adjustment of taxes occultes -was not such as to justify further examination".
in the manufacture or production" of these imports. 49 Importantly, the panel did not specify whether these chemicals still had to be physically present in the imported product. Even more to the point, the United States introduced a tax on ozone depleting chemicals and applied this tax also to imports of such chemicals or products containing or produced with such chemicals. No GATT or WTO decision was ever rendered on this tax, but like border adjustment for a carbon tax, this tax on ozone depleting chemicals is process-related; not related to the physical characteristics of the final imported product.
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The question is, ultimately, how broadly the WTO Appellate Body would interpret the words "internal taxes … applied … indirectly, to … products" in GATT Article III:2 51 and corresponding provisions in the Agreement on Subsidies and Counterveiling Measures. 52 The very idea of a carbon tax is to internalize the social cost of carbon in the ultimate price of products so as to give an incentive to both producers and consumers to limit the use of carbonintensive products and to shift to greener energy. From that perspective, a carbon tax is an indirect tax applied at least "indirectly" to products. As the very reason for the tax is to make carbon-intensive products more expensive, the tax does (or should) shift forward to consumers and therefore could be said to be adjustable at the border. The tax will, in other words, change the terms of competition, and to ensure trade neutrality the tax of the country of consumption 51 The corresponding provision in GATT Article II:2(a) refers to internal taxes "in respect of an article from which the imported product has been manufactured or produced". Such "article" could be interpreted as including the energy (and resulting carbon) used to produce the product. However, the equally authentic French text refers to "une merchandise qui a été incorporée dans l'article importé" which seems to require that the input is physically incorporated into the imported product. 52 The corresponding provision for border rebates upon exportation is broader. Paragraph (g) of Annex I to the Agreement on Subsidies and Counterveiling Measures permits border tax adjustment for exports more broadly for indirect taxes "in respect of the production and distribution of exported products". This could arguably cover process or production-related taxes such as a carbon tax. Paragraph (h) of Annex I, in turn, explicitly permits border tax adjustment upon exportation for a certain type of indirect taxes (namely, priorstage cumulative indirect taxes) even when such taxes are "levied on inputs that are consumed in the production of the exported product" including not only "inputs physically incorporated" but also "energy, fuels and oil used in the production process" (Footnote 61). Yet, specific environmental taxes such as a carbon tax are not "cumulative" indirect taxes and thus not covered by paragraph (h); as a result, they fall under the more general provision of paragraph (g elaborates on the required "nexus" between the tax and the products it affects. The panel found that GATT Article III:2 "requires some connection, even if indirect, between the respective taxes or other internal charges, on the one hand, and the taxed product, on the other". It found that a tax on soft drinks containing sweeteners other than cane sugar is a tax applied "indirectly" to beet sugar, among other reasons, because "the burden of the tax can be expected to fall, at least in part, on the products containing the sweetener, and thereby to fall on the sweetener". Even a distribution tax on soft drinks containing certain sweeteners was found to be a tax applied "indirectly" to beet sugar, although the panel admitted that, in that instance, "the degree of connection between the tax and the relevant products is more remote". 54 GATT Article II:2(a) only refers to an "internal tax" but cross-refers to Article III:2 so that it can be argued that the broader reference to "internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind" is controlling. 55 Ismer and Neuhoff, supra note 4 at 11, referring to an OECD definition. 56 In support: Ismer and Neuhoff, supra note 4, at 11 and de Cendra, supra note 5, at 135-136. 57 See de Cendra, supra note 5, at 135.
imports. 58 On the other hand, the requirement to hold an allowance for every ton of carbon emitted (even if the allowance was handed out for free) does impose an opportunity cost: if emissions are cut, the allowance could be sold on the market. To that extent, even free allowances impose a cost or tax that could arguably be adjusted at the border for imports. What happens if some of a company's allowances are handed out for free and others must be bought at auction? Some authors have suggested that in this case border tax adjustments can be imposed on imports using the average cost of the allowances. That is, if, for example, half of the allowances are allocated to each business free of charge and the second half had to be bought at a price of 100, the price used for the adjustment would be 50. 59 Another proposal in this context is to tax imports at the market price at which allowances are sold. 60 Under rational expectations, this market price can be assumed to be equal to the (higher) price paid at auction (in our case, 100).
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In that case, however, the claim may be made that imports (paying 100) are discriminated as against domestic producers (who received 50 per cent of their allowances for free), in violation of GATT Article III (discussed in Section C below).
What if both US federal climate policy for domestic, US businesses and the adjustment for imports take the form, not of a carbon tax, but of a requirement to hold emission allowances up to the amount of carbon emitted (either within the United States by the particular US business;
or, for imports, the carbon emitted abroad in the production of the import)? That is, for example, what Michael Morris, CEO of American Electric Power, recently proposed, namely that emission credits accompany exports from major emitting nations that have not joined a post-Kyoto global cap-and-trade framework or otherwise capped their emissions. 62 Applying WTO rules on border tax adjustment to such scheme would, obviously, be further complicated as in this case both the domestic measure and the adjustment at the border do not take the explicit form of a tax. Yet, if, as explained above, a domestic requirement to hold emission allowances could be qualified as, in 58 Indeed, some have argued that the free allocation of emission allowances (rather than a tax) is actually a subsidy that could be challenged under WTO rules. For a discussion see de Cendra, supra note 5, at 136-138. 59 Ismer and Neuhoff, supra note 4, at 11. 60 Ismer and Neuhoff, supra note 4, at 11. Similarly, Jean-Pierre Hauet, supra note 20, proposes a tax on imports based on the amount of carbon used in the production of the import multiplied by the unit price for carbon as it is traded in the European system averaged over the previous six months. 61 Ismer and Neuhoff, supra note 4, at 11, footnote 28. In this case, in particular, the question would arise of whether the free allocation of allowances -essentially a lump sum transfer to domestic firms -would run afoul of WTO rules against subsidies. See supra note 58. 62 This proposal does, however, raise the question of where exporters could buy these allowances? Presumably on the US market. However, if that would be the case, the total amount of allowances (or cap) would have to be increased so as to take account of carbon emitted by imports; if not, the price for allowances handed out with only internal US emissions in mind, would sky-rocket.
effect, an "internal tax or other internal charge of any kind" under GATT Article III:2, then so could the requirement to hold allowances for imports at the border. GATT Article II:2(a) on border tax adjustments permits adjustment in the form of "a charge equivalent to an internal tax".
The border requirement to hold an allowance is then arguably a "charge" which is "equivalent" to the internal requirement for US businesses to hold allowances which, in turn, is a kind of "internal tax".
Political and other reasons within the United States may prevent policy makers from calling climate legislation a form of "tax". Raising taxes is not particularly palatable for most US
politicians. Yet, for WTO purposes, if climate legislation can be defined as a product "tax", both as it applies to US businesses and imports, the legislation can more easily be justified under WTO requirements through the use of WTO rules on border tax adjustment. The reason is that under trade law, price-based measures such as taxes are regarded as more transparent and economically more efficient than regulation. 63 Hence, generally speaking, WTO rules push countries to adopt price-based measures such as tariffs or taxes, rather than quantitative import restrictions or trade restrictive regulation.
B. "Border adjustment" based on a domestic, US carbon "regulation"
In the previous section we have assumed that a US competitiveness provision would take the form of a price-based measure such as a tax or other charge on imports (or a measure, such as the requirement to hold emission allowances, that could be qualified as a "tax or other charge").
If so, it can be argued that WTO rules on border tax adjustment permit the imposition of such tax or other charge on imports as long as such tax is equivalent to the tax or other charge imposed on domestic US products. What now if the US competitiveness provision would take the form of a trade restrictive regulation on imports (or if, contrary to the argument made above, the requirement to hold emission allowances is not classified as a tax but as a regulation)? One could imagine, for example, that the United States imposes maximum carbon intensity standards (tons carbon equivalent emitted per ton of product produced) for energy-intensive products sold on the US market regardless of origin. A less trade restrictive type of carbon regulation would, for example, be to label all energy-intensive products as "harmful to our climate". 63 See also supra note 1.
In this case, the line between generally prohibited quantitative restrictions (GATT Article XI) and generally permitted domestic regulation (GATT Article III:4) is set out in an Ad Note to GATT Article III. This provision explains that "any law, regulation or requirement … which applies to an imported product and to the like domestic product and is collected or enforced in the case of the imported product at the time or point of importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as … a law, regulation or requirement … subject to the provisions of Article III".
In other words, even if US climate legislation were to restrict imports at the border, if it is applied also domestically in respect of US products, it should, in principle, fall under the more flexible GATT Article III (permitting regulations for as long as they are not discriminatory) rather than the stringent GATT Article XI (generally prohibiting quantitative import restrictions).
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Yet, as is the case for taxes and permissible border tax adjustment, not all domestic regulations can be applied to imports at the border. The Ad Note limits border adjustable regulations to "any law, regulation or requirement of the kind referred to in paragraph 1 [of Article III]". GATT Article III:1, in turn, is limited to "laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products."
As was the case for possible border tax adjustment in respect of carbon taxes, the question is whether a carbon regulation which, after all, targets the process or production method of, say, imported steel --not the physical characteristics of the steel itself --can be classified as a regulation "affecting … products". Put differently, is border adjustment for regulations limited to "product" measures or does it extend also to "process" measures? Two unadopted GATT panel reports found that "process" measures fall outside the scope of GATT Article III and must, instead, be presumed to be prohibited under GATT Article XI. These reports were issued --though never formally adopted by GATT parties --in the famous Tuna -Dolphin dispute where a US ban on certain tuna captured in a way that risks killing dolphin was found to violate GATT Article XI and not justified under the environmental exceptions in GATT Article XX (discussed below in Section VI). 64 Discussed earlier when referring to a complete ban or other quantitative restriction on imports from countries without emissions cuts in place, supra note 28.
The first Tuna -Dolphin panel explained the exclusion of "process" measures -such as carbon regulations -from the scope of permissible border adjustment under GATT Article III as follows:
"under the national treatment principle of Article III, contracting parties may apply border tax adjustments with regard to those taxes that are borne by products, but not for domestic taxes not directly levied on products (such as corporate income taxes).
Consequently, the Note Ad Article III covers only internal taxes that are borne by products. The Panel considered that it would be inconsistent to limit the application of this Note to taxes that are borne by products while permitting its application to regulations not applied to the product as such".
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Put differently, according to this panel, as is the case for taxes, regulations as well can only be adjusted at the border if they "apply to the product as such"; not if they regulate the producer. As the US domestic restriction on tuna harvesting "did not regulate tuna products as such … Nor did it prescribe fishing techniques that could have an effect on tuna as a product" 66 , the GATT panel found that the regulation could not be adjusted at the border for imported tuna. Hence, the US tuna ban was not covered by GATT Article III, but instead fell under (and automatically violated)
GATT Article XI.
Although the Tuna -Dolphin panels would almost certainly have decided against border adjustment for carbon regulations, the fact remains that these panels were never adopted and that WTO thinking on the issue of border adjustment has evolved, as discussed in Section A above.
Indeed, if the argument is that there must be broad equivalence between border adjustment for taxes and border adjustment for regulations (as the first Tuna -Dolphin panel itself found), then many of the arguments discussed in Section A above in support of permitting border adjustment for carbon taxes also support border adjustment for carbon regulations. Ultimately, the question is, once more, how broadly the WTO Appellate Body would interpret the words "regulations … affecting … products" in GATT Article III:1 and 4. As with border tax adjustment, some line must be drawn between purely producer regulations that cannot be adjusted at the border, and 65 GATT Panel report on United States -Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R, 3 September 1991, BISD 39S/155, at 5.13 66 Ibid., para. 5.10.
product-related regulations that can be adjusted at the border. However, this does not necessarily mean that all process regulations are by definition not adjustable. If they sufficiently "affect" the "product", that is, if, for example, their very purpose is to internalize certain negative externalities otherwise not reflected in product prices, they could be found to be subject to GATT Article III.
From that perspective, the "nexus" between a carbon regulation and the products affected by it (say, carbon-intensive steel or cement), could be found to be tight enough so as to permit a finding that the carbon regulation is one "affecting … products" in the sense of GATT Article III:4 and, therefore, adjustable at the border.
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At the same time, for process regulations --as opposed to process taxes --we do not have the above explained flexibilities set out in GATT Article III:2 (i.e., the reference to taxes "applied indirectly" to products), nor those set out in the Agreement on Subsidies and Counterveiling
Measures. Indeed, the Agreement on Subsidies and Counterveiling Measures only allows adjustment upon exportation (i.e. rebates) for taxes or duties, not for regulations. Therefore, the broad definition of "indirect" taxes; the reference to taxes "in respect of the production" of exported products; and the inclusion of certain energy taxes, do not broaden the adjustability of process regulations. 68 Moreover, the mere fact that a regulation increases the price of a product cannot, in and of itself, be sufficient for the regulation to be adjustable at the border (if not, a higher minimum wage in the United States as opposed to China, which arguably increases US product prices, might also become adjustable). To avoid such slippery slope a closer "nexus"
between the regulation and the product affected by it must be demonstrated (which, for carbon regulations, is not impossible 69 ). In the end, it would, therefore, be easier to adjust taxes at the border as compared to regulations, something that is not at all surprising given the preference (explained earlier 70 ) that trade law holds for taxes over regulations on the ground that the former are more transparent and efficient than the latter.
Even if a carbon regulation may not be adjustable at the border under GATT rules, there does remain the possibility that the extension of a domestic, U.S. carbon regulation to imports is justified by the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. This agreement applies to both technical regulations "which lay down product characteristics", that is, features inherent in the 67 For a panel report interpreting this "nexus" relatively broadly, see Mexico -Soft Drinks, discussed supra note 53. 68 All of which are discussed supra in note 52. 69 See supra text at note 67 and note 53. 70 See supra text at note 63.
product itself, "and their related processes and production methods". 71 Although this might be read as including only process regulations that leave a trace in the end product itself (as the process and production method must be "related to" the product characteristics), any carbon regulation that addresses "terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labeling requirements" would be covered by the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, as such requirements are covered as soon as they apply to "a product, process or production method" without the "related to" caveat. 72 In other words, a carbon label for energy-intensive products including imports would seem to fall under the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. It is more doubtful, however, whether, for example, a maximum carbon intensity standard would be so covered, as such standard is not limited to "marking or labeling" but actually prohibits certain high-carbon products to be marketed in the first place. Such standard would, therefore, be subject to the caveat that the process method must be "related to" the end product's characteristics. This may not be the case as no carbon traces are left in the end product itself.
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Once covered by the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade a carbon label or regulation on imports can be justified if it is, among other things, non-discriminatory (see Sections C and D) and "not more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective … inter alia: protection of the environment". 74 The latter requirement will involve an analysis similar to that under GATT Article XX discussed in Section VI. would apply equally to imports as opposed to domestic products (that is, US steel made with coal would be subject to the same restrictions as imported, Chinese steel made with coal), for our purposes, the issue is primarily whether, for example, steel from China made with coal (subject to a high carbon tax or regulation) is "like" domestically produced US steel using natural gas (subject to a lower carbon tax or regulation). In other words, one would not expect that US climate legislation will explicitly (or de jure) distinguish based on national origin; yet, the question remains whether, by taxing one type of steel differently than the other, US legislation distinguishes, in effect (or de facto), based on nationality.
C. National treatment: no discrimination of imports as against like US products
On the one hand, it would be rather odd for the WTO to intervene in this question of differentiating between types of steel depending on their carbon footprint, once the WTO has earlier accepted that carbon taxes or regulations can be adjusted at the border. 77 In the USSuperfund case, for example, the panel found that "the tax on certain chemicals, being a tax directly imposed on products, was eligible for border tax adjustment independent of the purpose it served". 78 In addition, under the substantive test of GATT Article III itself, the panel never questioned whether (taxed) imports produced with the chemicals were "like" US products not produced with the chemicals. Once it found that the tax was adjustable at the border, the panel simply "did not examine whether the tax on chemicals served environmental purposes and, if so, whether a border tax adjustment would be consistent with these purposes". 79 If this approach were followed by the WTO Appellate Body, then the distinction made by a carbon tax between high-carbon and low-carbon steel could be equally taken for granted so that it could at least be presumed that these different types of steel are not like (and a WTO member can, as a result, validly distinguish between them without violating its "national treatment" obligation). 75 The carve out in GATT Article II:2(a) for "charges equivalent to an internal tax", is only a carve out for the tariff discipline in GATT Article II; not for the national treatment discipline in GATT Article III, compliance with which is explicitly required in GATT Article II:2(a) itself. 76 For tax measures both "like" products and products that are "directly competitive or substitutable" can be compared (Ad Note to GATT Article III:2, second sentence). 77 Remember, in case no border adjustment would be permitted, then GATT Article III would not apply in the first place and, instead, a violation of GATT Article XI would be found. 78 Supra note 49 at para. 5.2.4. 79 Ibid.
On the other hand, a series of WTO disputes did revolve around perfectly "border adjustable" excise taxes on alcoholic beverages which were nonetheless found to be de facto discriminatory because the tax system taxed one type of alcoholic beverage (say, vodka) higher than another like (or directly competitive) alcoholic beverage that was predominantly domestically produced (say, shochu). If the WTO were to apply the test it thus adopted to determine likeness of products covered (or not covered) by a carbon tax or regulation, there is little doubt that, for example, steel made with coal and steel made with natural gas would, indeed, be found to be like. According to the WTO Appellate Body, "a determination of 'likeness' … is, fundamentally, a determination about the nature and extent of a competitive relationship between and amongst products".
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Now, as explained earlier in this paper, the very reason to introduce a competitiveness provisionthat is, to apply a US carbon tax or regulation also to imports -is that otherwise imports (say,
Chinese steel made with coal that was not subject to emission cuts) would gain an unfair competitive advantage as opposed to domestic products (say, more expense US steel made with carbon limits in place and, as a result, produced, for example, with natural gas). In other words, if the United States argues that it needs adjustment at the border because of competitiveness concerns, it cannot turn around later under a "likeness" examination and say that high-carbon and low-carbon products do not compete in the first place.
That said, even if imports covered by US climate legislation (say, a limited list of carbonintensive raw materials like steel and glass) and imports not so covered (say, less carbonintensive raw materials or finished products like cars) 81 --or one type of product compared to 80 Appellate Body Report on EC -Asbestos, supra note 73. For taxes, also "directly substitutable or competitive" products can be compared, see supra note 76. WTO jurisprudence has used the following four criteria to determine comparability: (1) physical characteristics of the products; (2) end-use; (3) consumer tastes and habits; (4) tariff classification (ibid., para. 101). Under all of these criteria, different types of steel depending on the energy used to produce the steel are most likely to be found comparable (they are physically the same; used for the same end-use; and not normally classified differently for import tariff purposes). Only the third criterion of "consumer tastes and habits" could arguably make them different if one could demonstrate that US consumers really do make a difference between types of steel in their consumption patterns based on climate change concerns; however, if this were the case, then there would be no need for competitiveness provisions in the first place as consumers themselves would already turn to, and be willing to pay a premium for, low-carbon products without any need for the government to intervene. 81 One could imagine, for example, that to make any scheme of border adjustment manageable, it could be limited to a certain number of raw materials that are particularly energy intensive. One study, premised on a carbon tax of 32 Swiss Francs (26 US$) per tonne of CO2, concludes, for example, that "only a handful another based on the energy with which it was produced --were all found to be "like", this does not by itself mean that the legislation discriminates based on national origin. As the Appellate which have been found to be "like", without, for this reason alone, according to the group of "like" imported products "less favourable treatment" than that accorded to the group of "like" domestic products".
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In other words, for a competitiveness provision in US climate legislation to be found to violate national treatment it must also be demonstrated that somehow the overall group of imported like products into the United States (e.g., all types of imported steel) is affected more heavily than the overall group of like domestic, US production (e.g., all types of US steel). This would require, for example, that US production is inherently or historically predominantly lowcarbon; whereas imports are predominantly high-carbon. In a more recent case, the Appellate Body required even more before it could find a national treatment violation. In that case, it was willing to accept a "detrimental effect on a given imported product" for as long as it could be "explained by factors or circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of the product". 83 If that finding were applied in an examination of a carbon tax or regulation under GATT Article III, then the environmental reasons summarized earlier could be used to explain why the tax or regulation relates to environmental concerns of climate change, not to "the foreign origin of the product". If that explanation were accepted, a violation of GATT Article III could be avoided, and there would be no need to go into the intricate requirements of the GATT Article XX justification (discussed in Section VI).
of carbon-intensive raw materials industries will see price increases … that are large enough to pose a meaningful threat to competitiveness. [Import adjustments] on bulk transfer of ten to twenty basic materials -unfabricated metals, bulk glass and paper, fertilizer and a few chemicals -should suffice to offset nearly all discernible impacts" (see Hoerner and Muller, supra note 52 at 21). 82 EC-Asbestos, supra note 80, at para. 100 (italics in original, underlining added). In respect of a tax that differentiates between "directly competitive or substitutable products" (see supra note 76), it must be proven that the tax is "applied so as to afford protection to domestic production" (Japan -Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, 4 October 1996, at p. 27-31 credits to be provided) could then be the amount of carbon that would have been emitted had the imported product been produced in the United States using the US predominant method of production. 84 This is exactly the system that was adopted in the Superfund legislation for the tax on imports produced with certain chemicals. The GATT panel in this dispute did not find fault with this mechanism. 85 The WTO Appellate Body Report in US -Gasoline did, however, find that if domestic gasoline refiners get an individual baseline --representing the quality of gasoline produced by that refiner --as a starting point for cleaner standards on gasoline, then not to give the same opportunity to importers (which, instead, had to follow a statutory baseline) is discriminatory. 86 The Appellate Body rejected US arguments that verification on foreign soil and enforcement problems related to tracking the exact refinery or origin of specific gasoline made individual baselines, based on information provided by the foreign refiners themselves, an unrealistic option (especially not if compared to similar problems faced in respect of domestic gasoline). Yet, the Appellate Body did agree that statutory baselines -or, in our case, the fallback of the US predominant method of production -could be used "when the source of imported gasoline could not be determined or a baseline could not be established because of an absence of data".
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An alternative method of calculation that has been suggested, largely to avoid any semblance of discrimination, is to calculate a carbon tax or emission allowance requirement on imports based on the carbon emitted using the best available technology. 88 This would mean that, for example, Chinese steel made with coal would only have to pay the price of carbon emitted for the same steel produced in the United States with the least polluting technology, say, natural gas. This would, of course, seriously reduce the amount of adjustment that can be imposed on imports and may not be sufficient to address competitiveness concerns. Yet, it would 84 In support, see Hoerner and Muller, supra note 52 at 35-6. 85 The same mechanism -voluntary reporting and backup imputation based on the US predominant method of production -was adopted also in the US ozone-depleting chemicals tax as well as the proposed BTU tax legislation of 1993. See supra note 50. 86 Appellate Body Report on US -Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, 20 May 1996. 87 Ibid., p. 27. 88 See Ismer and Neuhoff, supra note 4 at 15.
avoid claims of discrimination as all "like" products -for example, all steel -would then be taxed the same.
D.
Most-favored-nation treatment: no discrimination between like products from different countries US climate legislation must not only avoid discrimination of imports versus US products In this respect, at least two problems may arise. First, the United States may decide to apply a carbon tax or regulation only on imports from countries that do not have emission cuts in place. In that event, the United States would be granting an "advantage" to, for example, European imports (which are subject to emission cuts in Europe) which it does not "immediately and unconditionally" accord to, for example, China, Brazil or India (which do not have emission cuts in place). The question remains, however, whether European steel produced subject to an emission tax (or emission allowances) is "like" Chinese steel produced without such domestic restrictions. As explained earlier, WTO jurisprudence has interpreted "likeness" as a question of competitiveness so that the two types of steel are most likely to be found "alike". 89 Moreover, the distinction thus made between types of steel that are "like" can be said to be based on nation In sum, for a U.S. competitiveness provision to target only countries with no emission cuts in place would most likely violate MFN (the United States would then be treating "like"
products differently based on their origin); for a competitiveness provision to apply to all countries -including those that have their own emission cuts in place such as Europe --is less likely to raise an MFN problem (the United States can then be said to be treating all "like" products in the same way).
VI. Environmental exceptions in GATT Article XX
As indicated in the introduction to this paper, and hinted at throughout the analysis of the substantive rules of the WTO, any violation of the GATT may still be justified under the environmental exceptions of GATT Article XX as a measure:
development. Yet, as discussed below in Section VI, this differentiation could be justified (or even required) under GATT Article XX (and/or the Enabling Clause, see supra note 120). 92 If US border adjustment takes the form of a regulation, "rebating" a regulation upon export is not an option (under the Agreement on Subsidies and Counterveiling Measures it could even be regarded as a prohibited export subsidy, see supra text at note 70). In that case, the argument that European imports are discriminated against (because they are covered by a US carbon regulation applied to imports as much as Chinese imports) becomes stronger. On this view, discrimination could then be argued to exist not only when like products are treated differently (say, Chinese steel is taxed; not European steel); but also when different products are treated alike (say, Chinese steel with no emission cuts in place is taxed as much as European steel with emissions cuts). Yet, for Europe to convince the WTO that products become different or "unlike" based on whether they were produced with or without emission cuts in place would be hard, given the WTO's competitiveness test for likeness explained earlier (see supra note 80). Thus, even a carbon regulation that applies to all countries across the board would not likely violate MFN. ; later that year, it also found that a modified US ban on shrimp based on how these shrimp were caught abroad -that is, a pure 93 GATT Article XX(g). Alternatively, climate legislation might also be justified as a measure under GATT Article XX(b), namely: "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health". Yet, since the qualifier "necessary" (in Article XX(b)) is generally perceived as more difficult to meet than that of "relating to" (in Article XX(g)) this paper focuses on Article XX(g). 94 Violations of the Anti-Dumping and Subsidies Agreements are not generally understood to be justifiable under GATT Article XX. Hence, in the case of a carbon "tariff" (rather than a carbon tax or regulation), it is better to call it just that so that it becomes a tariff in violation of GATT Article II that might be justified under GATT Article XX; rather than a violation of the Anti-Dumping or Subsidies Agreement that cannot be justified under the environmental exceptions of GATT Article XX. 95 The first Tuna -Dolphin panel (supra note 65) found that the United States ban on tuna to protect dolphin abroad was not justified under GATT Article XX(b) as, according to the panel, this provision is "focused on the use of … measures to safeguard … animals or plants within the jurisdiction of the importing country" (para. 5.26). In addition, the panel found that if the United States were permitted to ban imports based on unilaterally determined US standards on dolphin protection, then the GATT "would provide legal security only in respect of trade between a limited number of contracting parties with identical internal regulations" (para. 5.27). Note that, for present purposes, a carbon tax or regulation would not impose a full ban, but rather an extra tax or charge. 96 See supra note 80.
process measure, similar to a carbon tax or regulation -was justified under GATT Article XX(g) as a conservation measure for endangered turtles.
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A. The conditions under paragraph (g) of GATT Article XX
For a carbon tax or regulation on imports to meet the GATT Article XX(g) exception,
three cumulative conditions must be met:
• Is the planet's atmosphere an "exhaustible natural resource"?: In previous cases, stocks of fish that were not even endangered (herring, salmon and dolphin), clean air and endangered sea turtles were found to be "exhaustible natural resources". 98 Considering the international importance given today to the problem of climate change 99 In all cases where the Appellate Body found that the GATT Article XX exception was not met, it did so under this introductory phrase. For present purposes as well, this phrase may well be the most important provision in the entire GATT agreement. The introductory phrase of GATT Article XX is not about the climate legislation as such, but about its "detailed operating provisions" and how it is "actually applied". 108 As importantly, under this phrase, according to the Appellate Body in US -Shrimp, the environmental policy goal no longer matters; the legitimacy of the policy goal and how the legislation relates to it must be examined under paragraph, not the introductory phrase. 109 Finally, the discrimination to be avoided under the would not, by definition, be able to justify it under Article XX. 112 At the same time, discrimination under the introductory phrase of Article XX covers both discrimination between different foreign countries exporting to the United States (MFN-type discrimination as was found to be the case in US -Shrimp) and discrimination between foreign countries and the United States (national treatment-type discrimination as was found to be the case in US -Gasoline).
With this general background in mind, when examining whether a U.S. competitiveness provision amounts to "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail", the Appellate Body, based on its decisions in previous environmental disputes, is likely to refer to at least the following three elements: 
VII. Conclusion
Concerns for U.S. economic competitiveness are a core explanation for why there is, to date, no US federal climate legislation (Section I). This paper examined the advantages and disadvantages of including a competitiveness provision in future U.S. climate policy (Section II).
Although such competitiveness provision could take different forms, one of the options is to enlist trade policy in the fight against global warming (Section III). Most controversial by far would be the imposition of trade restrictions on imports based on the carbon or other greenhouse gases that were emitted in their production abroad (so-called trade restrictions in respect of "foreign-emitted" or "offshore" carbon). Although there are certain options to be avoided as they would violate WTO law (e.g. anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties, discussed in Section V), the broader WTO consistency of such process-based restrictions is unclear and remains to be tested (Sections V and VI).
Notwithstanding these uncertainties, this section concludes with a specific proposal for a competitiveness provision in line with the guidelines developed throughout this paper, and lists the questions that such provision would raise under WTO law.
With the enactment of internal, US limits on greenhouse gas emissions --be it through a tax or cap-and-trade system --goods imported into the United States pay a "carbon tax" at the border.
A.
A first line of defense is that such carbon tax amounts to "border tax adjustment" explicitly permitted under WTO rules for product-related or indirect taxes (such as VAT or sales taxes). The carbon tax is then simply the extension to imported products of the tax or cost of holding emission allowances imposed on domestic, U.S. producers.
• Product scope: to limit the impact on trade, only a limited list of imports of energyintensive raw materials should be covered; studies indicate that only for these products serious competitiveness concerns arise; the administration of a carbon tax on imports, and the problem of determining the carbon footprint of goods produced abroad, would also be much easier if it applies only to some basic products (such as iron and steel, aluminum, cement, bulk glass, paper and a number of chemicals) and not to finished goods (such as cars, consumer goods and durables or drugs).
•
Level of the carbon tax on imports: The carbon tax on imports must be "equivalent" to the internal cost imposed by US climate legislation on US products. This cost can be calculated in a specific dollar amount per tonne of carbon emitted in the production of a certain imported product.
Calculation of the carbon footprint of imports: Importers are required to submit information on the amount of carbon emitted in the production of the product abroad;
such information is to be certified by the foreign manufacturer; in case no such information is provided, US customs can use the amount of carbon that would have been emitted when producing the product using the predominant method of production in the United States.
• Price per tonne of carbon: Once the number of tonnes of carbon emitted in the production of the import has been determined, US customs would need to multiple that amount by a certain price per tonne of carbon. If US climate legislation as it applies to US producers takes the form of a tax per tonne of carbon emitted, the price to be used is the amount of that tax. If US climate legislation as it applies to US producers takes the form of a cap-and-trade system, the price per tonne would be the market price at which an emission credit for one tonne of carbon was recently sold. This market price could be the average of the last 6 months or any other average that is as trade neutral as possible.
Complication in the event of free allocation of emission allowances: In case emission credits are handed out for free to US companies (for example, up to their current levels of emissions), the tax on imports at the border may have to be proportionally reduced. Free allocation of emission credits may also raise the claim that it amounts to a subsidy to US companies in violation of WTO rules (although free allocation has been, and remains, the rule in the European climate scheme).
The carbon tax could apply to all imports: If the WTO accepts the idea of adjusting an internal US carbon tax or cap-and-trade system to imports at the border under GATT rules on "border tax adjustment", then this tax can be applied to all imports, even imports from countries that have their own emission cuts in place and developing countries.
Upon exportation of such products, the country of origin can then simply "rebate" the tax that was paid there. Under GATT rules on "border tax adjustment" the purpose of the tax (in our case, combating climate change) was found to be irrelevant. Like an excise tax on imported cigarettes or a VAT (or sales) tax on imported clothes, no matter what the origin of the cigarettes or the clothes, the same tax is due. Not having to make any tax distinctions based on the origin of the import would obviously make administering the tax much easier. That is the crucial advantage of justifying the tax under "border tax adjustment" rules instead of the environmental exceptions in GATT Article XX.
B.
A second line of defense is that the carbon tax is justified under the environmental exceptions of GATT Article XX. This second line of defense is needed in case (i) the WTO would not permit "border tax adjustment" for a process-based tax or charge such as an internal, US carbon tax or cap-and-trade system or (ii) the WTO does permit "border tax adjustment" but the adjustment is found to discriminate imports as against US products or between different sources of imports (in case, for example, the US would not impose the tax on countries, such as Europe, with their own emission cuts in place, or exclude very poor developing countries). In those cases a GATT violation would arise and would need to be justified under the exceptions of GATT Article XX. Under that provision the most crucial requirement is likely to be the introductory phrase of GATT Article XX. It requires essentially that the carbon tax on imports is flexible and varies in a way that takes account of local conditions in foreign countries exporting to the United States (if not, the tax could be found to amount to "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail"). In case a carbon tax would need justification under GATT Article XX, two adjustments in particular would need to be made:
• A sliding scale based on efforts to fight climate change in the exporting country: if the exporting country has its own carbon tax or cap-and-trade system in place, the cost thus imposed on production abroad (to the extent it was not rebated upon exportation) should be deducted from the US carbon tax on imports; similarly, any export tax on the exportation of carbon-intensive products (as China is reported doing) must be deducted from the US tax on imports; to calculate the cost of carbon abroad under the climate legislation of a foreign country, similar rules as those developed above could be used (determine the carbon footprint; multiply it by the going price of carbon in the foreign country 
